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THE UNWARY PURCHASER IN UNFAIR TRADE CASES
By JULIUS R. LUNSFORD, JR.*
N CASES involving the sale of real estate, the legal maxim "Caveat
Emptor" (Let the buyer beware) is applicable. In sales of personal
property substantially the same rule applies.' The buyer in unfair

trade cases is not confronted with such a burden and assumes the
status of a "bona fide purchaser for value" in its true and literal meaning. Generally speaking courts do not decide unfair trade cases by
the caveat emptor rule of buyer and seller.'
Questions of infringements of trade-marks, as well as of unfair
trading, must'be approached from the point of view of the average
member Qf the public who purchases the goods involved. As a matter
of fact, the ordinary purchaser has a substantial interest in such suits,
though he is given no redress by the courts. As was said in Florence

Manufacturing Company v. J.C. Dowd Company,3 "The law has a
three-fold object: First, to protect the honest trader in the business
which fairly belongs to him; second, to punish the dishonest trader
who is taking his competitor's business away by unfair means; and,
third, to protect the public from deception."
The law of unfair competition can be succinctly stated in one sen-

tence-no one has the right to sell his goods as the goods of another.' Commercial law suits involving collection of notes and breach
of contracts may involve disputed questions of law, but the facts are
usually very simple. Unfair trade cases, on the other hand, are quite

different. The basic issue in unfair competition cases is usually one of
fact. The facts in these cases are found, not only on the labels of
*Of the Atlanta Bar.
(Author's Note: The Trade-Mark Act of 1946 went into effect on July 5, 1947. Much has been
written on the subject. It has been said "while it is true that many things are new, under this Act,
there is still much more in it, which is old; and even in dealing with the new matter in the Act,
we must be guided in many instances, by the accumulated judge-made law, of the common law cases,
and by our experience under the previous acts." Walter J. Halliday, at a lecture delivered on December 4, 1947 conducted by the Practicing Law Institute (who with Wallace H. Martin, is preparing
a text-book on the Act of 1946). With this in mind this writer is seeking uniformity of decisions by
discussing the importance of the Unwary Purchaser.)
1. STORY, SALES Sec. 348 (3d ed. -).
2. "It is no answer to this to say that if they had used their eyes they would have learned otherwise. Courts do not decide misleading markings by the caveat emptor rule of buyer and sel!er. One
who buys a standard, dependable article through a number of years learns to trust that article.
Use and years have led him to so trust it without question or inspection. If he is to be induced
to use any similar article, but which is in fact not the one to which he has grown accustomed,
such buyer is entitled to be unmistakably informed of that fact, and that some other than the
old-time maker is making the particular article for which he pays. It is not alone the rights of
rival makers that are concerned. They are able to take care of their respective rights; but the
consumer, on whom the substantial loss falls, in that he is led to pay his money for that which
he does not intend to buy, must be protected by the courts, and they can only do so by sanctioning no marking which travels near the border line of commercial deceit." Jenkins Bros. v. Kelley & Jones Co., 227 Fed. 211, 214 (C.C.A. 3rd 1915).
3. 178 Fed. 73, 75 (C.C.A. 2d 1910).
S. Ct..... 60 L. Ed. 713 (1916). Yale
4. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403 .........
Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F. 2d 972 (C.C.A. 2d 1928).

(48)
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packages, but in the stores of the dealers who handle the goods, and
in the minds of the purchasers of the goods. Are the purchasers deceived? The Federal Trade-Mark Act makes its remedies available
where the defendant's use of the mark "is likely to cause confusion or
mistake or to deceive purchasers as to the source of . .. goods and
services." 5 The customer which the courts consider is the ordinary
purchaser more commonly referred to as the "unwary purchaser." 6
The law has always protected the "unwary purchaser," although
they frequently refer to him by other terms. They so do by recognizing the right of the owner of a trade-mark or trade-name to be protected against the confusion or deception of a "casual customer,"' a
customer who is "thoughtless,". "unsuspecting, " "ignorant," "unthinking," "credulous,"'" "careless,"" who "merely looks, perhaps
' 13
hastily"" or who buys with the "usual inattention of a purchaser.'
The test of infringement then is not necessarily whether the imitation be "such as to mislead the careful and discriminating purchaserit is enough that it misleads the ordinary and casual buyer.' 4 "Ordinary purchasers include incautious, unwary, and ignorant purchasers."" Indeed, the law lays no burden upon a purchaser to be careful.
It recognizes that he may be without experience in discerning imitations," and without knowledge that imitations exist. "He acts quickly.
He is governed by a general glance. The law does not require more
of him.""
Similarity which deceives the intelligent, critical purchaser is not
the test of infringement. The courts are concerned only with the ordinary casual purchaser, who has the right to be careless." It is the
tendency to carelessness on the part of the potential purchasers, that
makes unfair competition profitable to the dishonest trader. 9 The
courts are therefore urged to be extremely solicitous to learn the
5. 60 STAT. 427, 437, See. 32 (1946); 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1051, Sec. 1114 (1) (a)
(Supp. 1947).
6. "It is not necessary that the similarity must be such as to deceive and mislead the cautious purchaser. It is sufficient to show the similarity is such as to deceive the ordinary and unwary purchaser." Allen v. Walker & Gibson. 2.1 Fed. 230, 237 (D. C. N. D. N. Y. 1916); Pee Scriven v.
North, 134 Fed. 866, 379 (C.C.A. 4th 1904).
7. Saxlehner v. Eisner & Mendelson Co., 1.9 U. S. 19, 41 (1900).
8. Little v. Kellam. 100 Fed. 353, 354 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1900).
9. Celluloid Mfg. Co. v. Cellonite Mfg. Co.. 32 Fed. 94, 97 (C. C. D. N. J. 1887).
10. Florence Mfvr. Co. v. J. C. Dowd Co., 178 Fed. 73, 75 (C.C.A. 2d 1910).
11. Brown v. Seidel, 153 Pa. St. 60, 71, 25 Atd. 1064 (193); Ohio Bakinz Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,
127 Fed. 116, 121 (C.C.A. 6th 1904): Coleman v. Crump, 70 N. Y. 573, 578 (1877).
12. Ward Baking Co. v. Potter-Wrightinaton, Inc., 298 Fed. 398, 401 (C.C.A. 1st 1924).
13. Pillsbury v. Pillsbury-Washburn Flour Mills Co.. 64 Fed. 841, 847 (C.C.A. 7th 1994).
14. Auto Acetylene Light Co. v. Prest-O-Lite Co.. 264 Fed. 810, 613 (C.C.A. 6th 1920).
15. Bissell Chilled Plow Works v. Bissell, 121 Fed. 357. 365 (C.C.A. 0th 1903); Singer Co. v. Wilson,
L. R. 3 App. Cas. 376, 394 (1877); Chesebrough Mfg. Co. v. Old Gold Chem. Co., 70 F. 2d 383, 385
(C.C.A. 6th 1031).
16. N. K. Fairbank Co. v. R. W. Bell Mfz. Co., 77 Fed. 869, 876 (C.C.A. 2d 1806).
17. Patton Paint Co. v. Orr's Zinc White, ,4S App. D. C. 221 (1918): Coca-Cola Co. v. Chero-Cola Co.,
27.1 Fed. 7n5. 756 (App. D. C. 1)21); In re Inderrieden Canning Co.. 277 Fed. 613 (App. D. C.
1922); Pillsbury v. Pillsbury-Washburn Flour Mills Co., 64 Fed. 841 (C.C.A. 7th 1894).
18. Pillbury v. Pillsbury-Vahhurn Flow- Mll. 6j.1Fed. 841. 947 (C.C.A. 7th 1S94).
19. In Hi-Land Dairyman's Association v. Cloverleaf Dairy, 107 Utah 68, 151 P. 2d 710 (1944), plaintiff was granted an in.(unction because of confusion of ordinary purchasers, citing a witness who
testified, "I don't go to a grocery store to read." Id. at 76, 151 P. 2d at 714.
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shortcomings of the unwary purchaser. Judge Coxe stated the law as
follows:
"The law is not made for the protection of experts, but
the public-that vast multitude, which includes the ignorant,
unthinking and the credulous, who in making purchases, do
stop to analyze, but are governed by appearances and general
pressions."" °

for
the
not
im-

COURT SHOULD PUT ITSELF IN POSITION OF UNWARY PURCHASER

It is within the province of the court to determine whether or not
the unwary purchaser is likely to be confused as to the origin of the
product he buys. If identical symbols are used on identical goods, the
decision 'should be easy. If there is evidence of actual instances of
confusion the decision is also easy. For actual confusion is certainly
proof of the likelihood of confusion. 2' If defendant's intent to copy
and imitate plaintiff's mark is established by proof then naturally the
defendant will be enjoined." In most cases these three factors are
lacking for obvious reasons: ( I ) Only a pirate or a thief would select
an identical mark for identical goods. (2) Few members of the public are willing to admit their mistakes or that they were fooled or
deceived. (3) The proof of intent on the part of defendant is as
difficult to establish to the court as is the showing of what is in the
customer's mind. However, it has been fairly well established that
defendant's intent will be presumed from the natural consequences of
his acts. 2 3 Therefore, those seeking to protect industrial property
must endeavor to convince the court that confusion and deception
are reasonably probable.
The first step the court should take is to put itself in the position
20. Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 Fed. 73, 75 (C.C.A. 2d 1910). Nims so admired this
statement that it appears on the title page of his book. For discussion of this subject, see NIMS,
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS See. 1024-38 (4th Ed. 1947). But see Hilson Co. v.
Foster, 80 Fed. 896, 898 (1897).
21. See 2 NIMs, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS Sec. 335 (4th Ed. 1947); Weiss v. Stork
& Gift Shop, 137 N. J. Eq. 475, 45 A. 2d 688 (1946). "The consequences of the defendant's acts
and not the motive for them, determine whether this court should interfere." This rule is well
established in the Second Circuit. Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Landers, Frary & Clark, 131 Fed. 693
(C.C.A. 2d 1904); Collinsplott v. Finlayson, 88 Fed. 693 (C.C. S.D. N.Y. 1898); Saxlehner v.
Eisner & Mendelson, 138 Fed. 22 (C.C.A. 2d 1905); F. W. Fitch Co. v. Camille, Inc. 106 F. 2d 635
(C.C.A. 8th 1939).
22. My-T-Fine Corp. v. Samuels, 69 F. 2d 76, 77 (C.C.A. 2d 1934).
23. Warner & Company v. Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924); Elgin National Watch Co. v. Illinois
Watch Co., 179 U. S. 665 (1901); N. K. Fairbank Co. v. R. W. Bell Mfg. Co., 77 Fed. 869 (C.C.A.
2d 1896); Holmes, Booth & Hayden v. Holmes, Booth & Atwood Mfg. Co., 27 Conn. 278, 296
(1870); ("Every man, acting intelligently, will be presumed to intend the necessary consequences
of his acts. The same presumption applies with less force perhaps, to the probable and ordinary
consequences."). In Coca-Cola Co. v. Loft, 19 Del. Ch. 292, 167 At]. 900 (1933), aff'd mera., 20
Del. Ch. 456. 180 Ati. 927, the Chancellor commented: "If the case is one where infringement of
a properly registered trade-mark is shown, a wrongful or fraudulent intent is presumed; but in
other cases lying in the same general field of unfair trade practice and competition, a wrongful
intent in fact must be shown or justified by inference as the inequitable consequence of the act
or acts complained of."
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of the ordinary 'or unwary purchaser."4 This is not easy. Judges are
far better equipped mentally than the average consumer. Their legal
training tends to make them more discriminatory in their analysis
and determination. They may not be as impartial as the average purchaser because they are faced with the efforts of astute counsel and
sometimes the ingenuity of the defendant, who is desirous of getting
close enough to a well-known mark to fool the public, and, at the
same time, staying far enough away to fool the court.25 The difficulties
facing a judge were clearly expressed in the Canadian case of British
Drug Houses Limited v. Battle Pharmaceuticals:26
"The courts have realized the difficulty involved when a judge
seeks to project himself into the minds of other persons in order
to ascertain what the effect of certain circumstances would be
likely to have on them and, with a view to reducing the extent
of the subjective attitude to a given problem of this kind, have
laid down certain principles, both%general and specific, as guides
to be followed...
"The court should . . . seek to put itself in the position of a
person who has only a general and not a precise recollection of
the earlier mark and then sees the later mark by itself; if such a
person would be likely to think that the goods on which the later
mark appears are put out by the same people as the goods sold
under the mark of which he has only such a recollection, the
court may properly conclude that the marks are similar . . .
Moreover, it is the likely effect of the use of the later mark on
the minds of the ordinary dealers or users generally that must be
considered and people as a rule have only a general recollection
of a particular thing, rather than a precise memory of it."
The court usually attributes to the average consumer far more intelligence than he really possesses. In Browne v. Swan and Edgar
Ltd." Mr. Justice Farwell, a distinguished English jurist, taking exception to a previous decision explained the problem in the following
manner:
"They (Trade Witnesses) are not experts in human nature,
24. In McGraw-Hill Publishing Co. v. American Aviation Associates, 73 App. D. C. 131, 117 F. 2d
293 (1940) Judge Vinson (Now Chief Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court) stated at page 294:
"In following the first method, it must be remembered that the law of trade-marks is for the
market place. Its purpose is to protect the several manufacturers in their respective spheres of
public relations and to safeguard the consumer by helping him get what he thinks he wants.
The method starts, therefore, with placing oneself in the position of a purchaser."
25. Dunhill v. Bartlett & Bickley, 39 R.P.C. 426 (Ch. Div. 1922): "Of course, few would be stupid
enough to make exact copies of another's mark or symbol. It has been well said that the most
successful form of copying is to employ enough points of similarity to confuse the public with
enough points of difference to confuse the courts." Baker v. Master Printers Union of New Jersey.,34 F. Supp. 808, 809 (D.C. D. N.J. 1940).

26. 4 Fox's PATENT CASES, 93: (1944) 4 D.L.R. 577, 581, 584.
27. Bourne v. Swan & Edgar, Ltd., 1 Ch. 211, 224, 20 Rep. Pat. Cas. 105, 118 (1902).
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nor can they be called to give such evidence, and apart from admissibility, one cannot help feeling that there is a certain proneness in the human mind to think that other people are perhaps
more foolish than they really are . . .It only remains then to call
the evidence of people who can say that they themselves would
be deceived. Now it is obviously extremely difficult to get any
such evidence. Nobody quite likes to admit that he is so extremely
foolish, as in many cases he would have to do ...I have referred
to the decision of Vice-Chancellor Malius. He disregarded the
positive testimony of a lad), who said she had been deceived and
said that really, looking at the two marks, it was impossible."
Generally speaking, the opinions quoted from, supra, were written
by judges who realized the problems confronting the unwary purchaser. The jurists did not have too much difficulty in assuming the
role of the ordinary purchaser in the market place. However, as time
passes, the courts seem to have more and more difficulty in placing
themselves in the position of the average buyer. This may be partly
because some judges overlook the fact that while educational standards have improved, only a small portion of the consuming public
has received the benefit of this progress. Also the number of brand
names has increased enormously in recent years. The advertising
and promotional efforts of the owners of brand names has increased
accordingly. This has created a situation where the average purchaser,
even though possessing a higher I.Q., is just as likely to be confused as
in the past. In fact, confusion has been accentuated by the speed at
which we live and the greater amount of money in circulation, which
factors tend to diminish the time and care ordinarily allotted to the
purchase of relatively inexpensive articles. To fully understand the
court's conception of the unwary purchaser, it is necessary to examine
some recent decisions.
CONFLICTING DECISIONS

The rights and duties of the unwary purchaser are summarized by
Rogers,2" Nims" and Callmann." The general rule of law relating
to the unwary purchaser is indeed a liberal one. But in applying it
questions such as the character of the goods, the use to which they are
put, where they are sold, and the manner in which they are ordered,3
must be considered. If purchasers of the particular item are careful,
28. Rogers, The Unwary Purchaser, 8 MICiL. L. REV. 613 (1910). Every decision that had
written at that time is referred to or cited.
29. 2 NIMS, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS, p. 1024-1027 (4th Ed. 1947).
30. 2 CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS, p. 1137 (1945).
81. Enoch Morgan's Sons Co. v. Troxall, 23 Hun. 632 (N.Y. 1881).

been
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they are likely to be observant. If, in fact, they are unobservant, it
will take less in the way of resemblance to deceive them."
Callmann points out that low priced articles in wide use are bought
by the "casual" purchaser without great care. He cites such products
as ice cream,33 cheese,34 chocolate," candies,"0 beer,37 soft drinks,' gasoline,39 etc. On the other hand, valuable articles are purchased only
after deliberate and careful consideration. Such articles include refrigerators,4 0 cash registers," silverware," and chinaware. 3
In attempting to reconcile conflicting decisions, it is then only
natural to refer to the differences in the characteristics of the goods,
the habits and intelligence of the purchasers for particular articles,
and the manner in which the goods are sold.
To the extent that decisions cannot be reconciled it is in large
measure because some courts are unable to put themselves in the
position of the unwary purchaser. Others can do this, and in addition, can realize that the courts' protection must extend, not only to
the customer, but also to the owner of the mark, whose trade is being diverted. It has been aptly put:
"We can only contemplate, speculate and weigh the probabilities of deception arising from the similarities and conclude as our,
and the District Judge's reactions persuade us.""
Ofttimes we fail to get a determination of a fact upon conflicting
evidence. Frequently, therefore, the case is determined by the court's
opinion of the likelihood of the public being deceived. The effect of
this is that the decision is based on the probability of the court being
deceived rather than on the likelihood of the average purchaser being
deceived. This, no doubt, in a large degree, was the reasoning behind
the following conclusion by Judge Minton in CaliforniaFruit Growers
Exchange v. Sunkist Baking Company :
"Unless 'Sunkist' covers everything edible under the sun, we
cannot believe that anyone whose I.Q. is high enough to be regarded by the law would ever be confused or would be likely to be
confused in the purchase of a loaf of 'bread branded as 'Sunkist'
because someone else sold fruits and vegetables under that name.
32. Liggett & Myer Tobacco Co. v. Hynes, 20 Fed. 883 (D. C. W. D. Ark. 1884).
33. In re Dutch Maid Ice Cream Co., 95 F. 2d 262, 264 (C. C. P. A. 1938).
84.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Breakstone Bros. v. Gerber & Co., 58 F. 2d 419, 421 (C. C. P. A. 1932).
Walter Baker & Co. v. Altomay Chocolate Co., 37 F. 2d 957 (C. C. P. A. 1930).
J. N. Collins Co. v. F. M. Paist Co., 14 F. 2d 614 (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1926).
Wirtz v. Eagle Bottling Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 164, 169, 24 AtI. 658 (1892).
Federal Trade Commission v. Good Grape Co., 45 F. 2d 70 (C.C.A. 6th 1930).
Standard Oil Co. v. Independent Oil Men of America, 58 App. D, C. 372, 30 F. 2d 996, 997 (1929).
Kelvinator Corp. v. Norge Corp., 94 F. 2d 384 (C. C. P. A. 1938).
Matter of Applications by the National Cash Register Co., 34 R. P. C. 273 (Ch. Div. 1917).
International Silver Co. v. American Silver Co., 37 F. 2d 622. 623 (C. C. P. A. 1930).
Lenox, Inc. v. Jones, McDuffee & Stratton, 271 Fed. 511 (D. C. D. Mass. 1921).
Colburn v. Puritan Mills, Inc., 108 F. 2d 377, 378 (C.C.A. 7th 1939).
California Fruit Growers Exchange v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F. 2d 971, 973 (C.C.A. 7th 1949).

But see Judge Minton's decision in Singer v. Golden, 171 F. 2d 266 (CC.A. 7th 1949).
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The purchaser is buying bread, not a name. If the plaintiffs sold
bread under the name 'Sunkist' that would present a different
question; but the plaintiffs do not, and there is no finding that the
plaintiffs ever applied the word 'Sunkist' to bakery products."
Manifestly, the "unwary purchaser" presents something of a
problem to the equity judge who, as the result of the trial, is in possession of numerous facts wholly unknown to and unconceived of by
the "unwary purchaser." All unconsciously, the judge may endow him
with like knowledge of all these facts and likewise attribute to him his
own keenness of perception and analysis. But such person, so transformed, is no longer the unwary purchaser.
In a case concerning trade-marks for coffee,4" it was held that the
word "Lorraine" is so similar to the registered trade-mark "La Touraine" as applied to coffee as to be likely to cause confusion among
reasonably careful purchasers. The eminent jurist, Jerome Frank,
while realizing the basic problem, stated his views in dissent as fol,
lows:
"Undeniably, on the issue of infringement, confusion of customers is pivotal. I agree that there need be no proof of actual
instances of such confusion-where its likelihood is unmistakably
clear. Where that is the case, an appellate court may reject a contrary conclusion by the trial judge.
"However, courts, when not guided by evidence, may easily go
wrong on that subject. Tests made by a competent psychologist
of the reactions to trade names that had been previously involved in litigation indicate that the judicial decisions have not infrequently failed to match the responses of ordinary consumers.
Even without the benefit of such tests here, however, I would
agree that, were the customers, for whose patronage plaintiff and
the defendant compete, ordinary retail buyers, there would be
enough likelihood of confusion to prove infringement.
"But here the defendant company does not sell to ultimate
consumers; nothing in this record even intimates that such persons, when they drink the defendant's coffee, are aware that it
bears any particular name. For defendants sell solely at wholesale to owners of small restaurants;and there is no evidence that
they inform their retail customers of the brand sold to the latter
at retail by the cup. Concededly, there is no similarity in the packages of the parties; the only similarity consists in the names. This,
then, is decidedly pertinent. With respect to probable confusion,
46. La Touraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F. 2d 115, 124 (C.C.A. 2d 1946).
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whether the class of buyers is sophisticated has been held to be a
matter of prime importance."
One wonders whether Judge Frank took judicial notice that "small
metropolitan restaurants" in New York and Staten Island are operated largely by foreigners. It is common knowledge that this is true
of the majority of small restaurants throughout the country. It is
difficult to conceive that in the great mecca of New York City the
same is not even more true. A court should take judicial notice of such
facts. It has been well stated: "The rule is, that a judge is not to shut
his eyes to what everybody else of intelligence knows."4 So courts
have considered the fact that the purchaser might be a minor,4" purchasing articles for parents; that goods are sold in sections where a
large number of inhabitants of foreign birth live; 49 that many prospective purchasers may habitually converse in a foreign language;"
and that an ordinary purchaser of soap powder "is not usually of a
high degree of intelligence, and has never had the experience of an
equity judge in analyzing the elements which make the general appearance of a package ...
This writer believes Judge Frank has correctly stated one test:
"Whether the class of buyers is sophisticated has been held to be a
matter of prime importance." Yet in Triangle Publications v. Rohrlich,52 where the majority enjoined the use of "Miss Seventeen" for
girdles on the complaint of the owner of the trade-mark "Seventeen"
for a magazine, this learned jurist in his dissent endows the unwary
purchaser with a part of his own knowledge and intelligence by reaching the following conclusion:
"To illustrate: Suppose that a candy merchant made and sold
candy called 'Cadillac.' No one would think that that candy was
made or sponsored by the manufacturer of the Cadillac automobile. Nor would the automobile manufacturer be entitled to an injunction against the candy-maker merely because the latter deliberately chose the name, intending to acquire the advantages
accruing to him from the elaborate advertising of the Cadillac."
47. Re Excelsior Shoe Co., 40 App. Div. Ch. 480 (1913). The Court took judicial notice of the
existence of the "Boy Scouts." In Century Distilling Co. v. P. H. Schneider Brewing Co., 26 F.
Supp. 936, 937, 938 (D. C. D. Colo. 1938), aff'd,107 F. 2d 699, Judge Symes took judicial notice
of the fact that a habitual purchaser of whiskey seldom buys beer. Schering & Glatz, Inc. v.
Sharp & Dohme, Inc., 146 F. 2d 1019, 1023 (C. C. P. A. 1944).
48. Ohio Baking Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 127 Fed. 116 (C.C.A. 6th 1904); Pecheur Lozenge Co.
v. National Candy Co., 36 F. Supp. 730, 736 (D. C. D. N. J. 1940). A decree for plaintiff was
reversed, without opinion. 122 F. 2d 318 (C.C.A. 3d 1941). In a dissenting opinion Judge Clark
said that probability of deception "may take account of the kind of customer."
49. Kostering v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 116 Fed. 620, 621 (C.C.A. 9th 1902); R. B. Davis Co.
v. Sher, 125 N. J. Eq. 316, 5 A. 2d 49 (193S); Keystone Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. Arena & Sons.
Inc.. 27 F. Supp. 290, 292 (E. D. Pa. 1939).
50. George Jensen & Wendel v. Georg Jensen Handmade Silver, 111 F. 2d 169 (C. C. P. A. 1940).
51. Fairbanks Co. v. Bell Mfg. Co., 77 Fed. 869, S76 (C.C.A. 2d 1896).
52. Triangle Publications v. Rohrlich, 167 F. 2d 969, 978 (C.C.A. 2d 1948).
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In Bulova Watch Company v. Stolzber, 53 Judge Sweeney disagreed
with Judge Frank by concluding that the manufacturer of "Bulova"
shoes stands to injure plaintiffs' (owner of the mark "Bulova" for
watches) reputation and dilute the quality of his trade-mark. He
pointed out that the defendant has little cause to complain since he
has been riding the coattails of the plaintiffs' good will, and he had
available to him a wide range in the choice of names for his products.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, one of
the leading courts in unfair trading cases, has been unable to agree
on whether or not two competing names are likely to cause confusion
in the minds of the public. In addition to the coffee case and Seventeen
cases, discussed supra, Judge Frank some years earlier wrote the
majority opinion" which overruled the trial court's finding that the
names Chateau Martin and Chateau Montay for wines were so
similar "in sound and appearance .. . as to make confusion of the two
probable." One circuit judge dissented without an opinion. This decision refers to an alleged trend to afford only limited protection
which was announced in Durable Toy and Novelty Corporation v. J.
Chein & Co.55 There it was held that a manufacturer of a toy bank
featuring the words "Uncle Sam" could not enjoin the use of "Uncle
Sam" on cheaper banks where no buyers were confused.
It is believed that the basis of the denial of relief in this case (the
trial judge had granted relief)" was that "Uncle Sam" is part of the
national mythology-and it (the court) cannot deprive others of the
same commercial advantage which led it originally to adopt a legend
so commonly employed." True, the court said "the witnesses who
testified that they knew the plaintiff's product-were buyers of toys
of retail dealers" and were not confused. The rule is that it is likelihood of the deceit of the ultimate purchaser that is important-as well
as that of a dealer.
If the Durable Toy case established a trend it was shortlived and
the courts have been as indifferent to the alleged trend as the customers were to the source of the toy. This writer believes that the
correct view is stated in the two Seventeen cases, 5 the "V-8" decision" and the "Stork Club" case.59 The decision in the last case
contained the following statement: "It may well be true that a prudent and worldly-wise passerby would not be deceived. The law, however, not only protects the intelligent, the experienced, and the astute
53.

Bulova Watch Co. v. Stolzberg, 69 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1947).
54. Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F. 2d 955 (C.C.A. 2d 1943).
55. 183 F. 2d 858 (C.C.A. 2d 1943).

56. 47 F. Supp. 167 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1942).

57. Hanson v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 163 F. 2d 74 (C.C.A. 8th 1947); Triangle Publications,
Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F. 2d 969 (C.C.A. 2d 1948).

58. Standard Brands. Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F. 2d 34 (C.C.A. 2d 1945).
59. Stork Restaurant. Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F. 2d 848 (C.C.A. 9th 1948).
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-it also safeguards from deception the ignorant, the inexperienced,
and the gullible. This is the teaching of the Supreme Court of the
United States and it has been followed in this and in other circuits."6
The late Edward S. Rogers gave the following explanation: "If
the particular judge thinks the defendant in the case before him ought
to be enjoined, he is enjoined. The result is then rationalized. This
can easily be done; the evidence is usually inconclusive.""
Mr. Rogers spent well over twenty years observing and studying
the ordinary purchaser and his actions in the retail outlets. He had
studied purchasers of Quaker Oats, Baker's Cocoa, Ingersoll watches,
Big Ben clocks, Holeproof hosiery, Coca-Cola and dozens of other
trade-marked articles. He reached the following conclusions:
"In the first place, the ordinary purchaser is less well informed than we think he is; he is inattentive, indifferent and careless;
he does not keep in mind the details of packages and labels, infrequently examines with care what is offered to him; he seldom
reads labels; he pays little attention to names of manufacturers,
and, as a matter of fact, in nine cases out of ten does not know
who makes the goods he is in the habit of buying."6
A more conservative view is expressed by Professor Ralph Brown:
"The figure of the unwary, casual, incautious, unsuspecting purchaser
suggests conclusions which those who favor him could scarcely confess; that people are not very bright" and ". . . the depressing of the
judicial standard from 'reasonable' to 'ordinary' to 'ignorant' is unwise." 63 Nevertheless, Professor Brown clearly admits that the
average (whether he be reasonable or unwary) purchaser is often
confused, although he blames this confusion on persuasive advertis60. Id. at 359. But see Fruit Growers Co-operative v. M. W. Miller. 170 F. 2d 834 (Wis. 1948), a
decision of the Seventh Circuit, reversing the trial court, 73 F. Supp. 90 (D. C. E. D. Wis.
1948), which required the defendant to distinguish his goods labeled "Sturgeon Bay" from those
of plaintiff bearing the identical mark. The Circuit Court stated there was no basis for the
lower court's finding that there was "actual confusion" though two witnesses' testified they were
confused. Likelihood of confusion was not the test. Incidentally, both courts held the mark to
be invalid, yet the Patent Office published plaintiff's application to register "Sturgeon Bay" in
the December 28, 1948, Official Gazette, Vol. 617, No. 4, p. 968, under the authority of Sec. (2F)
of the act of 1946. 60 STAT. 428, 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1052 (F).
61. Rogers, New Directions in the Law of Unfair Competition, 74 N. Y. L. Rev. 317, 327 (1940).
62. GOODWILL, TRADE-MARKS & UNFAIR TRADING, Page 67. See also Chapters VI "A Study of the Consumer" and XIV "What Constitutes Infringement."
63. Brown, Advertising and The Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade-Symbols, 57 YALE L.
JOURNAL 1165, 1198, at page 1196 (1948): "The judge has to try to put himself in the position
of the customer, and to decide whether he. as a customer, would be likely to be deceived. But
what is the position of the customer in a world ruled by advertising? From the time he picks
up his morning paper until he switches off his radio at bedtime he is bombarded with literally
thousands of trade symbols. He goes to work in a public conveyance papered with them. His way
is linked with billboards and shop windows proclaiming them. He checks the date from an advertiser's calendar, winnows a harvest of leaflets from his mail, closes the window against a
sound truck, and perhaps escapes for a few hours. Then on his return home he exposes himself
to a stupefying flow of persuasion from the radio. When he ventures into a store to perform the
the act of buying, myriads of symbols, attached to exhortations, pleas, reminders, and threats,
stir uneasily in his subconscious, while hundreds more dance before his eyes from packages,
posters, and animated displays. Is he confused? Undoubtedly. The Judge comparing in isolation,
now 'Chateau Martin' with 'Chateau Montay' wine, now 'LaTouraine' with 'Lorraine' coffee,
cannot reproduce the murky totality of a trip to the market. No more can the psychologist with
his laboratory tests for confusion."
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ing. But whatever the reason for confusion it should be of no great
concern. If the average consumer is confused relief should be granted,
and in granting it doubts should be resolved against the newcomer.64
RECOMMENDATIONS

Mr. Rogers pointed out that the unwary purchaser is pretty thoroughly investigated objectively but not subjectively-as he definitely
should be. He recommends that an honestly conducted survey under
the supervision of the court be employed to show whether or not confusion or deception exists.65 This would appear to be a logical solution. It certainly is in line with the reasoning of Judge Frank, who in
the Seventeen case, 6 took it upon himself to interview teenagers as
to whether or not they were confused or deceived as to the source
of the girdles.
At the request of Mr. Rogers, Professor Munsterberg, a pioneer
applied psychologist, began work in I9O9 to find a formula by which
to measure the deceptive similarity of an imitation." With the advantage of Munsterberg's suggestion that "psychology" be applied
to this branch of the law, Dr. G. A. Feingold published a monograph
for the purpose of supplying "a scientific guide to courts of law
whereby they could settle disputes arising from trade-mark infringement more equitably." He conducted a series of experiments using
the old mark and the new mark, employing mathematics and psychology. He states his resultant formula as follows:
% Incorrect Identifi% Difference
=7
Similarity
X
cations of a new
or ioo%
Item
Similarity
No. of Items Changed
Incorrect Discrimina- }
= K68
X
tions of all Duplicate
X
No. of Items Exposed
Items
To obtain the correct result the value K is added algebraically to the
percentage of correct recognitions of the variable item.
Arthur Greenberg, a prominent New York trade-mark attorney,
pointed out that this formula was too complicated, and that if courts
64. E. Z. Waist Co. v. Reliance Mfg. Co., 286 Fed. 461

(App.

D. C.

1923); Moline Plow Co. v.

Omaha Iron Store Co., Omaha Iron Store Co. v. Moline Plow Co., 235 Fed. 519 (C.C.A. 8th
1916); Northam Warren Corp. v. Universal Cosmetics Co., 18 F. 2d 774, 775 (C.C.A. 7th 1927):
Crawford-Austin Mfg. Co. v. Clifton Mfg. Co., 25 F. 2d 976, 979 (D. C. W. D. Tex. 1928), aff'd,
30 F. 2d 392 (C.C.A. 5th 1929); Skelly Oil Co. v. Powerine Co.. 86 F. 2d 752 (C. C. P. A. 1936).

65. Rogers, New Directions in the Law of Unfair Competition, 74 N. Y. L. REv. 317, 327-330 (1940).
66. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F. 2d 969 (C. C. A. 2d 1948).
67. MUNSTERSERG, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE MARKET. Mr. Rogers conducted an experiment, himself.
covering the trade-marks "Red Crown" and "Red Hot." See Herzfeld, American Methods of
Determining the Confusability of Trade-Marks, 26 T. M. BULLETIN 1, 31 (1931), and, BULLETIN
OF THE U. S. T. M. Ass'N. Vol. 22, p. 107-111.
68. Feingold, Recognition and Discrimination, PSYCHOL. REV. MONOGRAPH (1915).
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are to recognize any psychological formula it must be simple in its
application. 9
R. H. Paynter, author of "Trade-Mark Infringement," took sixty
pairs of litigated trade-marks involving infringements of words and
tried to represent the varying degrees of deceptive similarity. The
observed were divided into two groups-the uninformed who did not
know imitations existed and the informed who knew that there were
imitations. The instructions to the informed group included the allimportant sentence: "The confusion may be due to the appearance of
the trade-marks, their sound, their meaning and their significance."
His results were as follows: (i) The individuals who are unaware
of the presence of imitations confuse, on the average, 44% of the
imitations with the originals, and correctly discriminate 56%. The
awareness of the presence of imitations reduces the state of confusion and about 25 % of the imitations are confused with the originals;
51% are correctly discriminated, and 26% of the imitations are not
recognized as resembling the originals. (2) It is observed that the
scores of confusion of the imitations do not divide into two distinct
groups, those likely to deceive and those not likely to deceive, but
their distribution forms a continuum. (3) The most scientific method
of determining the question of infringement would be the construction and application of a psychological scale for the measurement of
deceptive similarity of two trade-marks. The lower the degree of
deceptive similarity of two trade-marks, the less is the confusion, and
the greater the ability to recognize the change.
In connection with this last result Paynter 7 ° marked out a "Scale
of Relative Position Confusion of Trade-Marks" on the basis of his
tests. This scale included eighteen pairs of trade-marks listed in the
order of their determined infringement possibilities. Each pair is
given a confusion grade rating of from .x, the least confusion, to IO,
absolute confusion. He then picks an arbitrary grade, 2.4, and sugguests that trade-marks receiving above 2.4 are illegal and any receiving less are legal. When a new case comes up the pair of trade-marks,
around which there is a controversy, can be compared with the various
steps on the scale. A number of individuals are asked to match independently, as closely as possible, the new pair to the one on the scale,
and rate it according to the corresponding grade. From the average
grade of confusion thus obtained, it may be determined whether the
imitation is an infringement or non-infringement. If the average grade
of these ratings is 2.4, or less, the imitation is a non-infringement; if
more, an infringement.
69. Greenberg, Confusion Between Two Theoretical Trade-Names, 26 T. M. BULLETIN 103 (1931):
Greenberg, Confusion Between Two Theoretical Trade-Names, 27 T. M. BULLETIN 23 (1932).
70. PAYNTER, TRADE-MARK INFRINGEMENT, p. 52.
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Greenberg conducted an experiment with three groups of college
students as the subjects, using the marks "Red Hat" and "Red Top."
An outline of his experiment as a whole was given in his article, and
is in substance as follows:
A. (i) The subject was given sixty cards, twelve of "Red Top"
and twelve each of four other different designs, which he was to observe at two sittings a week apart, each sitting consisting of ten trials.
Thirty subjects participated. (2) The final test for each subject was a
recognition test, the subject being shown twenty-five designs of cards
among which "Red Hat" had been substituted for "Red Top." The
subject was to recognize five designs on cards with which he had worked. The procedure was reversed, thirty subjects making observations
in each proceeding. "Red Hat" was used in the original showings.
"Red Top" was substituted in the recognition.
B. The procedure with the second of the three groups of subjects
was the same as with the first except that in the recognition test "Red
Top" appeared again without substitution. "Red Hat" was used in
the original showings. "Red Hat" appeared again in the recognition
test without substitution.
C. The first part of this experiment was like the preceding two
parts. In the recognition test, in which forty subjects were dealt with,
both "Red Hat" and "Red Top" appeared. In the original showings
"Red Hat" was used. Both "Red Hat" and "Red Top" appeared in
the recognition test.
In experiment A, 97% of the subjects picked the substituted "Red
Hat" card as the card they had seen originally. In experiment B, 930
recognized the "Red Top." Combining the results from the two experiments, he found 95% to be confused. The results of experiment
C revealed that 73% thought they had seen both "Red Hat" and "Red
Top" in the original exposures, whereas in reality they had seen only
"Red Hat."
It is significant to note that this experiment was conducted with college students. Imagine the results with high school students, grammar
school students, or the unwary purchaser. The average purchaser is
not a college graduate, perhaps not a high school graduate, as only
approximately 3.47% of the persons in the United States have had
the advantage of a college education; 16.67% have attended high
school for four years and 2 1.67% have completed seven or eight years
in elementary school. Furthermore, there are 3,780,000 illiterate people in the United States."

While the recommendations involving surveys, and psychological
71. Sources-Bureau of the Census and Graphics Institute.
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and scientific tests are desirable, it is the opinion of this writer that
if the courts will observe the following rules, the position of the
unwary purchaser can easily be assumed:
I. A Trade-Mark Should Not Be Dissected
2.

The Memory Test Should Be Applied

3. A Side by Side Comparison of Marks Should Be Avoided
4. The First Impression of a Mark Should Govern
(I)

A TRADE-MARK SHOULD NOT BE DiSSECTEp
BUT EXAMINED AS A WHOLE

The Supreme Court of the United States has stated the rule to be
that, "The commercial impression of a trade-mark is derived from it
as a whole, not from its elements separated and considered in detail.""3
The ordinary buyer does not have time to stop and dissect the marks,
and should he be deceived, it is because he has been deceived by the
mark as a whole-not by its component parts taken .separately.
In Penzoil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petroleum Company, 3 the court
said:
"In many cases involving the question of confusing similarity,
there is repeatedly displayed a tendency toward complexity resulting from the miscroscopic examination and intricate dissection of the marks. This practice tends to obscure rather than
clarify and must be criticized. The marks must be examined in
their entirety."
This rule is universal in-its application. As was stated by the House
of Lords of Great Britain in Aristoc Ltd. v. Rysta Limited :
"Little assistance, therefore, is to be obtained from the meticulous comparison of the two words, letter by letter and syllable by
syllable, pronounced with the clarity to be expected from a
teacher of elocution."
In short, the two marks involved should not be examined with a
microscope to detect minute differences, nor dissected, but should be
viewed as a whole-just as the unwary purchaser views them.75
72. Beckwith v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U. S. 538, 545, 40 S. Ct. 414 (1920). See also BrownFormon Distillery Co. v. Arthur M. Block Liquor
73. 159 M. D. 187, 24 T.M.R. 183 (C. P. 1933), aff'd,
v. Wrigley, 245 Fed. 824, 829 (C.C.A. 6th 1917)
the packages were different, both in words and
general appearance.

Importer, 99 F. 2d 708 (C.C.A. 7th 1938).
80 F. 2d 67 (C. C. P. A. 1935). In Helmet Co.
the court said that though certain features of
color, there was a striking similarity in their

74. A. C. 68, 86 (1945).
75. Bickmore Gall Cure Co. v. Karns, 134 Fed. 833 (C.C.A. 3rd 1905); Coca-Cola Co. v. Chero-Cola
Co., 51 App. D. C. 27, 273 Fed. 755 (1921).
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THE MEMORY TEST

In determining whether or not a defendant's mark is likely to cause
confusion or deception, the court should endeavor to look at and listen
to the two marks through the eyes and ears of the public. To accomplish this, the court must see and hear one in the absence of the other.
When a buyer sees a trade-mark, he has only his memory of the image
and sound of other trade-marks with which to compare it.76
In McGraw-Hill Publishing Company v. American Aviation Associates, Inc., supra, the court stated:
"One should look at the plaintiff's trade-mark to obtain a general impression, the impression that would be carried in the
memory and then to observe, still as a buyer, the defendant's
mark, to determine if it is likely to be mistaken for this memory
trade-mark of plaintiff.""7
This has been termed the memory test. The buyer is not bound to
make comparisons and usually has no opportunity to do so." The
ordinary purchaser of common and inexpensive articles relies upon
his memory and subconscious impressions and gives the purchase no
great thought. "

(3) A

SIDE BY SIDE COMPARISON OF THE MARKS
SHOULD BE AVOIDED

If the court considers the two marks side by side, there may be
little trouble in detecting differences between them.8" It must be remembered that the question is one of similarity, not of identity. Resemblances, not differences, must be considered. The marks, then,
are not to be considered side by side. This is a privilege which the
unwary purchaser is denied. Usually, in fact, he does not even know
that there are two marks. Furthermore, if he does know that there
are two marks, he does not have the assistance of counsel to help him
76. Stuart v. F. G. Stewart Co., 91 Fed. 243 (C.C.A. 7th 1899).
77. 117 F. 2d 293 at 294, 295 (App. D. C. 1940).
78. Scriven v. North, 134 Fed. 366, 379 (C.C.A. 4th 1904): "It is to be remembered that a purchaser
of an article of general use, which in the course of years has come to be known as of superior
quality, and recognized by certain catchwords and certain visible marks, may be easily deceived
into buying articles of inferior quality, designated by words of similar signification and superficially resembling the genuine: for he does not usually have the opportunity of seeing the genuine
and imitation side by side. He commonly has in mind only the characteristic features in the
designation and appearance of the article he wishes to buy, and is exposed to impositions if the
imitation, though slight, is of those salient features, and thus the reputation and good will established by years of advertising and production of articles of superior quality would be frittered
away, if inferior goods, sufficiently resembling the genuine to be mistaken for them, are put on
the market and readily sold as and for the genuine. The imitation goods may not be identical in
any one feature, but, if similar in all and designated by similar marks and similar catchwords,
the sale would be enjoined, or the imitation permitted only under such limitations as will prevent misaprehension on the question of its real character, and so differentiated that the public
will not be imposed on or the complainant defrauded.
79. Best Foods Inc. v. Hemphill Packing Co.. 5 F. 2d 355, 357 (D. C. D. Del. 1925); MeLellan Stores
Co. v. Conrad, 57 App. D. C. 176, 18 F. 2d 826, 827 (1927).
80. Win. Waltke & Co. v. Geo. H. Schafer & Co., 49 App. D. C. 254, 263 Fed. 650 (1920).
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distinguish between them. Some courts recognize this.8 Such a comparison usually takes place unconsciously, however. The court should
realize this difficulty and endeavor to avoid it. The English courts
have so avoided it. In Sandow Limited, application (I 914) 3 i R. P.

C. 196,

205,

Sargent, Jr., had this to say:

"The question is not whether, if a person is looking at two
trade-marks side by side, there would be a possibility of confusion; the question is whether the person who sees the proposed
trade-mark in the absence of the other trade-mark and in view of
only his general recollection of what the nature of the other
trade-mark was, would be likely to be deceived and to think that
the trade-mark before him is the same as the other, of which he
has a general recollection."
A side by side comparison of competing products is not the test for
determining confusing similarity."
(4) THE FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF A MARK SHOULD GOVERN
The court must be guided by its first impression8 ' of the mark as a
whole just as the buyer views it. 4 Again we can look to the English
courts for guidance. The House of Lords in Aristoc Ltd. v. Rysta
Limited, supra, stated:
"The answer to the question as to whether the sound of one
word resembles too nearly the sound of another, so as to bring
the power within the limits of Section 12 of The Trade-Mark
Act of 1938, must nearly always depend on first impression, for
obviously a person who is familiar with both words will neither
be deceived nor confused."
As a rule the public is not required to analyze trade-marks with
scrupulous care.5 The courts should take notice of this rule.
THE PUBLIC INTEREST

The public interest has a significant role in the law of trade-marks
and unfair competition. It has been stated that "consumption is the
sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for
81. McDonald & Morrison Mfg. Co. v. H. Mueller Mfg. Co., 183 Fed. 972, 974 (C.C.A. 8th 1910);
Brown-Forman Distillery Co. v. Arthur M. Block Liquor Importers, 99 F. 2d 708, 710 (C.C.A. 7th
1938).
82. Lactona, Inc. v. Lever Brothers Co., 144 F. 2d 891 (C.C.P.A. 1944); Celanese Corporation of
America v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Company, 154 F. 2d 143 (C. C. P. A. 1946).
83. Ward Baking Co. v. Potter-Wrightington, 298 Fed. 398, 401 (C.C.A. 1st 1924).
84. Kaut Reith Shoe Co. v. International Shoe Co., 45 App. D. C. 545 (1917); Vortex Mfg. Co. v. PlyRite Contracting Co., 33 F. 2d. 302 (D. C. D. Md. 1929).
85. Celanese Corp. of America v. Vanity Fair Silk Mills, 47 F. 2d 373, 375 (C. C. P. A. 1931).
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promoting that of the consumer.""0 In every unfair competition case
the plaintiff is acting, not only in his own interest, but in the interest of
the public. 7 The primary public interest is in the preservation of
honesty and fair play in business and in protecting the fruits of individual enterprise from those who wish to reap where they have not
sown.
The protection of trade-marks originated as a police measure to
prevent "the grevious deceit of the people by the sale of defective
goods."8 8 This is still the basis of protection. A person cannot adopt
and use a mark which so resembles another in-sound or appearance
as to mislead, confuse or deceive purchasers. As long as we live in a
democracy where people have the right to make a free selection of
the things they buy, they deserve to get what they ask for or what
they think they want when they buy. The Supreme Court has said:
"The consumer is prejudiced if, upon giving an order for one thing,
he is supplied with something else. In such matters, the public is
entitled to get what it chooses, though the choice may be dictated by
caprice, or by fashion, or perhaps by ignorance." 9 Therefore, the
doctrine of unfair competition is based upon the theory of protection
to the public as well as upon the right of the seller to enjoy the good
will and reputation symbolized by his trade-mark, and some trace of
fraud is a necessary element before any relief can be granted the
party plaintiff ."
A trade-mark has a further function other than to designate origin
and ownership. It serves as a guarantee to the public that the purchased article emanates from the same source and assures the buyer
that he will receive on subsequent calls the identical trade-marked
article which has given him satisfaction in the past.
The people of our great country are easily fooled or hypnotized.
The people of the United States believe what they hear, what they
see, and whatever is imposed upon them suddenly or under the guise
of authority. Only a few years back, a radio broadcast by Orson
Welles had the inhabitants of several Eastern states believing our
86. ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, Bk. IV, Ch. 8, p. 625 (1937).
87. General Baking Co. v. Gorman, 3 F. 2d 891, 893 (C.C.A. 1st 1925), cert. den., 268 U. S. 705, 45
S. Ct. 639, 69 L. Ed. 1167 (1925). The court said: "It should never be overlooked that trademark and unfair competition cases are affected with a public interest. A dealer's good will is
protected, not merely for his profit, but in order that the purchasing public may not be enticed
into buying A's product when it wants B's product. In meritorious cases of this kind, the plaintiff is acting, not only in his own interest, but in the public interest. The situation is radically
different from that which arises in cases of alleged infringement of a copyright or patent, under
which the rights originate in a monopoly grant from the government. The existence and extent
of such monopolies are, therefore, except as they reward and thus promote ingenuity, adverse to
the rights of the purchasing or using public. In one aspect, the alleged infringer of a copy-right

or of a patent is in a fight for the public interest-to make a free and open field. But unfair
competition-of which trade-mark infringement is but a part ... is, broadly speaking, grounded
on the right of both dealer and purchasing public to be protected from frauds of which both are

victims."
88. SCHECHTE, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING To TRADE-MARKS p. 20 (1925).
89. F. T. C. v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U. S. 67, 78 (1983).
90. Manhattan Shirt Co. v. Sarnoff-Irving Hat Stores, 19 Del. Ch. 151, 163, 164 Atl. 246 (1933).
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country was being invaded by men from Mars. A big noise, a good
pretense, such as a person looking up in the sky on Broadway resulting
in traffic being stopped by curious passers-by, a mob clamor, and a
political pledge, moves the majority of the American people. The
words "fire sale" or merely "sale" always lure Americans. Such public reactions, no doubt, caused P. T. Barnum to remark: "There is
a sucker born every minute."
A recent article in a monthly periodical91 points out the gullibility
of the American public. This article tells of a visit to twelve firstclass bars at which specific orders for "I. W. Harper" were placed.
In only two establishments did the customer receive what he ordered;
what he paid for. This sad state of affairs exists despite state laws.
The author commented as follows: "The beverage-control laws of
most states usually state plainly that a customer shall receive the
brand he requests, and no substitutions shall be made without so informing him and obtaining his permission. Yet some bartenders are
substituting one brand of liquor for another as a matter of course.""
Apparently, these state laws are not enforced. It is left to the
owner of the injured brand name to bring a suit to restrain the retailer from substituting, to protect his reputation and to prevent the
public from being beguiled. Otherwise, purchasers are led to believe
that the manufacturer of the brand that they specify is putting out
a cheap and inferior product, or at least that it has changed.
The public has been protected in trade-mark cases for well over a
3
hundred years by our courts, both state and federal. No better guide
can be found than in passages from opinions written through the years
by the late Mr. Justice Holmes. While Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, he wrote:
"Whatever might have been the doubts some years ago, we
think that now it is pretty well settled that the plaintiff, merely
on the strength of having been first in the field, may put later
91. McLeod Morgan, Make Them Show You the Bottle, Cosmopolitan, Nov. 1948, p. 55.

C.
92. Ibid at p. 124. In Timken Roiler Bearing Co. v. Leterstone Sales Co., 27 F. Supp. 736, 737 (D. the
N. D. Ill. 1939) it was said: "One guilty of such practices (substitution) may not escape

consequences by informing the buyer when the goods are delivered that they were made by a
manufacturer different from the one who had been held out as the maker." See also Singer
Mfg. Co. v. Golden, 171 F. 2d 266 (C.C.A. 7th 1949).
93. The first American trade-mark case to-be reported was decided in 1837, Thomson v. Winchester,
19 Pick. 214. State laws under different titles, but all looking toward the Protection of the public
by means of the regulation of marks on goods, were passed in New York in 1845; Connecticut
in 1847; Pennsylvania in 1847; Massachusetts, 185Q; Ohio, 1859; Iowa, 1860; Michigan, 1863;

Oregon, 1864; Nevada, 1865; Kansas, 1866; Maine, 1866; Missouri, 1866. The first federal law was

passed in 1870, 16 STAT. 198 et seq., and held unconstitutional in Trade Mark Cases 100 U. S. 82
(1879). This was followed by the Act of March 3, 1881, 21 STAT. 502 et seq., superseded by the
Act of February 20, 1905. 33 STAT. 724 et seq. The present Act was passed in 1946 and became

effective July 5, 1947, 60 STAT. 427 et seq., 15 U. S. C. A. Sec. 1051 et seq. For leading state trademark cases see: Lady Esther, Ltd. v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, 317 Ill. App. 451, 46 N. E. 2d
165 (1943); Kay Jewelry Company v. Kapiloff, 204 Ga. 209, 49 S. E. 2d 19 (1948). In Academy

of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Benson, 15 Cal. 2d 685. 691, 104 P. 2d 650. 653 (1940),

the court made the following statement: "The defendant has adopted a name which prima facie
is broad enough in its concept to be mistaken by the ordinary unsuspecting person for the institution created by the incorporators of the plaintiff."
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comers to the trouble of taking such reasonable precautions as
are commercially practicable to prevent their lawful names and
advertisements from deceitfully diverting the plaintiff's cus'
tom."94
After he assumed his position on the Supreme Court of the United
States he continued to prevent the practice of deception:
"It is said that the trade-mark here is that of the French
House and truly indicates the origin of the goods. But that is not
accurate. It is the trade-mark of the plaintiff only in the United
States and indicates in law, and, it is found, by public understanding, that the goods come from the plaintiff although not made by
it. It was sold, and could only be sold, with the good will of the
business that the plaintiff bought." 95
A year later, Mr. Justice Holmes defined the rights conferred by a
trade-mark as follows:
"It (the mark) does not confer a right to prohibit the use of
the word or words. It is not a copyright-a trade-mark only
gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the
owner's good will against the sale of another's product as his.When the mark is used in a way that does not deceive the public,
we see no sanctity in the word as to prevent its being used to
tell the truth. It is not taboo. ' ' "
The public interest in trade-mark cases is well embedded in the
present day judicial mind. It has been summarized by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter who stated the basis of trade-mark protection as follows:
"The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the
psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by
symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them. A
trade-mark is a merchandising shortcut which induces a purchaser
to select what he wants or what he has been led to believe he
wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by
making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market
with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the
means employed, the aim is the same-to convey through the
mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the
commodity upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the
trade-mark owner has something of value. If another poaches
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141, 142, 43 L. R. A. 826 (1899). See also Herring-Hal-Marvin Safe Co. v. Hall's Safe Co., 208

U. S. 654, 28 S. Ct. 350, 62 L. Ed. 616 (1908).
95. BourJois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U. S. 689, 43 S. Ct. 244 (1923).
96. Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U. S. 859, 368 (1924).

1949]

THE UNWARY PURCHASER

upon the commercial magnetism of this symbol he has created,
the owner can obtain legal redress.""7
There are some people who would deny trade-mark protection, even
go so far as to destroy trade-marks under the guise of protecting the
public against monopolies. These mistaken reformers apply the word
monopolies to trade-marks because monopoly is merely an ugly word
they apply to things they dislike." They do not stop to realize that
the owner of real estate has a monopoly to the extent that he can prevent trespassers from destroying his property.9
Trade-marks are the essence of competition because trade-marks
identify and distinguish products. Identification means responsibility;
responsibility on the part of the manufacturer in guaranteeing to the
purchaser an assurance that the goods he buys are the same as those
which have given previous satisfaction. The proof that trade-marks
are the essence of competition is in the following decision:
"Rival manufacturers may lawfully compete for the patronage
of the public in the quality and price of their goods, in the beauty
and tastefulness of their enclosing packages, in the extent of
their advertising, but they have no right, by imitative devices, to
beguile the public into buying their wares under the impression
they are buying those of a rival.'' 1.
On the other hand, there is no legitimate reason for adopting a
name resembling a well-known mark other than to fool the public.
Judge Coxe said: "It is so easy for the honest business man, who
wishes to sell his goods upon their merits, to select from the entire
material universe, which is before him, symbols, marks and coverings
which by no possibility can cause confusion between his goods and
those of competitors, that the courts look with suspicion upon one
who, in dressing his goods for the market, approaches so near to his
successful rival that the public may fail to distinguish between them."'' 1
CONCLUSION

A trade-mark is not a government grant and should not be confused with a patent or a copyright. As has been repeatedly pointed out
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here, a trade-mark is a means of identification having three functions:
(i) to indicate origin, (2) to guarantee quality, and (3) to serve
as an advertising symbol. One who offers a new product to the public
has a duty to distinguish his goods so that ordinary people are not
fooled into buying the new product in the belief that they are buying
the old one. We should all be cognizant that the phrase "Let the
Buyer Beware" has no place in unfair trade cases. Mr. Justice Black
has summarized the purchaser's interest in the following comment:
"The fact that a false statement may be obviously false to
those who are trained and experienced does not change its character, nor take away its power to deceive others less experienced.
There is no duty resting upon a citizen to suspect the honesty of
those with whom he transacts business. Laws are made to protect
the trusting as well as the suspicious. The best element of business has long decided that honesty should govern competitive
enterprises, and that the rule of caveat emptor should not be relied upon to reward fraud and deception. 10 2
The new trade-mark law (Lanham Act) is in effect. Its purpose has
been defined by the legislative committee as follows:
"The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is two-fold.
One is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably
knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get.
Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy,
time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from misappropriation by pirates and
cheats. This is a well-established rule of law protecting both the
public and the trade-mark owner . . . Your committee believes
the proposed
bill accomplishes these two broad basic prin1 03
ciples.'
It is therefore up to the judiciary to uphold the right of the unwary purchaser who is entitled to freedom of choice, and this right,
to paraphrase Mr. Justice Sutherland, cannot be satisfied by imposing
upon0 4 him a similar article instead of the original and genuine prod1

uct.
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